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Lukashenka has to choose: 
reforms or concessions to Russia
Kamil Kłysiński, Wojciech Konończuk
The most serious crisis in the history of Russian-Belarusian relations has 
been taking place over the past few months. In 2007 Russia started the 
process of depriving Belarus of subsidies in the form of supplies of fuels 
at low prices, which have for more than a decade guaranteed the stabili-
ty of the Belarusian economic model, and is continuing this process now 
at an accelerated rate. At the same time, the Russian media started at-
tacks on Alyaksandr Lukashenka from the middle of this year. This toughe-
ning up of Russia’s measures indicates that the Kremlin is determined to 
implement its goals regarding Belarus, including first of all taking over its 
strategic economic assets, which would result in a significant weakening of 
Lukashenka’s position. The Belarusian government has been consistently 
avoiding meeting Russian demands, while at the same time insisting on 
the reinstatement of preferential conditions of co-operation. If the Bela-
rusian leader continues resisting Russian demands, the crisis in Russian- 
-Belarusian relations will be aggravated, and a conflict over energy issues 
around the turn of 2011 cannot be ruled out. 
The reduction in preferences offered by Russia in the energy sector has 
significantly impaired the condition of the Belarusian economy, and may 
lead to its breakdown in a year or two. As his country comes under in-
creasing pressure from Russia, Alyaksandr Lukashenka will soon have to 
make a strategic choice between yielding to the Kremlin’s demands and 
embarking upon an at least partial restructuring of the economy.
Russia is toughening up its policy towards Lukashenka
Since the beginning of 2010, Russia has taken a number of economic and political measures 
which demonstrate that it is hardening its policy of reducing preferences for Belarus in the 
energy sector, which began in 2007. Under the protocol to the oil supply contract of 2007, 
which was signed on 27 January 2010, the customs duty on oil supplied to Belarus was ra-
ised from 35% of the normal rate to 100% (the duty-free contingent covers only 6.3 million 
tonnes of the approximately 22 million tonnes of oil Belarus imports annually). Additionally, 
this June saw a gas crisis between Russia and Belarus, as a result of which Russia enfor-
ced payment for gas according to the price formula set in the gas contract as of late 2006. 
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This meant an increase in the price from US$150 per 1,000 m3 to the present level 
of US$194. Earlier, under an informal deal with Russia, Belarus had been paying for gas 
at a lower rate. At the same time, also under the gas contract, Russia announced the li-
quidation of discounts in the prices of gas supplied to Belarus and their adjustment to the 
so-called European average price, starting from 2011. Furthermore Lukashenka, still hoping 
to maintain Russian preferences, agreed to enter the Customs Union with Russia and Kaza-
khstan as of 1 January 2010. Although the participation in this integrative structure enables 
the duty-free exports and sale of Belarusian goods on the Russian market, it still poses 
some threats to the Belarusian economy, related to the need to adjust to the higher customs 
duty rates in the case of imports from countries which do not belong to the Customs Union1. 
Additionally, Minsk’s key demand, the lifting of export duty on Russian oil, has still not 
been met. Moscow has stated that this will happen when Belarus has joined the Common 
Economic Space, which is still being created (by 1 January 2012 at the earliest). However, 
Belarus would have to surrender part of 
its economic sovereignty to Russia in the 
case of such integration. It must also be 
noted that when the first sections of the 
BTS-2 oil pipeline and the Nord Stream 
gas pipeline are put into operation, as is 
planned for the end of 2011, Belarus will 
lose in significance as a transit country for 
Russian fuels to the West, and at the same 
time Russia will have more opportunities 
to use energy blackmail against Belarus. 
Russia has also taken political actions 
towards Belarus. An unprecedented infor-
mation campaign has been waged against 
Lukashenka in the Russian media since this June. The NTV channel (controlled by Gaz-
prom) showed a series of four documentaries in which the Belarusian leader was accused of 
ordering the murders of his political opponents, using anti-Russian rhetoric while benefiting 
from Russian economic subsidies for years, conducting illegal financial operations, and 
benefiting from smuggling. It was also suggested in the films that he has a mental illness. 
Similar allegations have also been made in programmes on other major Russian TV stations. 
The action as a whole seems to be a coordinated campaign ordered directly by the Krem-
lin. President Dmitri Medvedev and the Russian State Duma joined this information war 
in October by criticising the Belarusian leader’s policy in quite strong language. 
The goals of the Russian campaign
Although several Russian-Belarusian conflicts have taken place over the past few years, mainly 
over fuel prices, the Kremlin has never used such harsh rhetoric towards Minsk before. It seems 
that Moscow is aiming to achieve several goals this way. First of all, the Kremlin wants to take 
over strategic assets in Belarus (including refineries in Mazyr and Navapolatsk, control of Bel-
transgaz as well as chemical, machine-building and metallurgical plants), and thus to gain con-
trol over a greater part of the Belarusian economy, which would also ensure it political control of 
the country. A loyal and subjugated Belarus is necessary for Russia to build a deeper integration 
structure, the Common Economic Space, on the foundations of the Customs Union. The Krem-
lin is also probably demonstrating its dissatisfaction with Minsk’s failure to fulfil its promise to 
recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is a matter of prestige and 
reputation for Moscow. To make its pressure more effective, Russia has intensified its actions 
in the context of presidential elections in Belarus (to be held on 19 December). 
Since the beginning of 2010, Russia 
has taken a number of economic and 
political measures which demonstrate 
that it is hardening its policy of reducing 
preferences for Belarus in the energy 
sector, which began in 2007. Under 
the protocol to the oil supply contract of 
2007, which was signed on 27 January 
2010, the customs duty on oil supplied 
to Belarus was raised from 35% of the 
normal rate to 100%.
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The Russian information campaign is also addressed to the Belarusian nomenklatura, among 
whom Russia seems to have been trying to build up a pro-Russian faction for some time. 
The Kremlin expects that by demonstrating the withdrawal of its support for Lukashenka, it will 
cause the emergence of an opposition group in the short term within the Belarusian political 
elite on whom Moscow could base its further policy towards Belarus. So far the Belarusian 
leader has been able to control the nomenklatura effectively, by using such measures as the 
preventive pacification of any signs of dissatisfaction from some of its members. However, it is 
uncertain whether the Belarusian elite will remain loyal to Lukashenka, as the conflict betwe-
en him and Russia is intensifying and the economic situation in their country is deteriorating. 
It is also worth noting the fact that the films 
shown on Russian television were targeted 
only against Lukashenka and his son Viktar, 
and did not criticise any other representative 
of the Belarusian ruling class. Last but not 
least, the changes in the Russian policy and 
the media campaign are not targeted against 
Belarusian society. Russia is consciously try-
ing to avoid the emergence of anti-Russian 
sentiments in Belarus, such as could arise, 
for example, as a result of the imposition of 
economic sanctions. 
The media campaign is also addressed to 
the West. By discrediting Lukashenka, Russia is trying to cut off Belarus from co-operation and 
political support from the West. Thus Russia wants to limit Minsk’s room for manoeuvre on 
the international arena, and prove that it is destined to co-operation with Russia on the condi-
tions dictated by Russia. 
The state of the Belarusian economy is weakening
The continuing reduction in Russian preferences has laid bare the weakness of the outda-
ted Belarusian economic model, one of whose main sources of stability and development 
were the lower prices of fuels supplied from Russia. Some of these negative trends have 
clearly strengthened since the beginning of this year, and within one or two years may cause 
an economic breakdown in Belarus. 
The new conditions for Russian oil supply and processing have had a strong negative effect 
on the condition of the strategic petrochemical industry, which generated around 10% 
of Belarus’ budget revenues in the preceding years. Russian oil imports yielded lower pro-
fits, as a consequence of which oil supplies between January and June 2010 fell by almost 
50%, and refinery production by 30%. It was only possible to maintain a minimal profi-
tability level in refinery production by mixing the full-rate oil with the duty-free contingent 
(the latter theoretically meant for internal use in Belarus). 
The situation is much worse in the chemical industry. Unlike refineries, chemical plants 
have not been granted any duty-free contingent for Russian oil products or the semi-finished 
products necessary in their production cycles. The products were also covered with a full-
rate customs duty at the beginning of 2010. The plants’ financial condition has significantly 
deteriorated as a result. In effect, profitability in the first quarter of 2010 in the petroche-
mical industry as a whole fell from 9.5% to 0.9% year-on-year. If Russia further reduces 
or liquidates the duty-free oil contingents, and (as it initially announced) raises the rate of 
the customs duty on oil products, this sector may become totally unprofitable. 
First of all, the Kremlin wants to take 
over strategic assets in Belarus and 
thus to gain control over a greater 
part of the Belarusian economy, which 
would also ensure it political control 
of the country. A loyal and subjugated 
Belarus is necessary for Russia to 
build a deeper integration structure, 
the Common Economic Space, on the 
foundations of the Customs Union. 
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2 According to the Argus agency’s 
calculations and officially 
unconfirmed statistical data, 
a tonne of Venezuelan oil costs 
approximately US$95 USD 
more than Russian oil with the 
full-rate export duty imposed.
The continuing increase in gas prices is an equally serious problem for Belarus. According 
to the gas contract of December 2006, the price of gas supplied to Belarus for the first time 
in 2011 is to reach the same level as that offered to Western recipients (which is calculated 
on the basis of the so-called average European gas price) minus transit fees and export 
duty. According to Gazprom’s calculations, the price would rise from the present US$194 
to a level between US$220 and US$250 for 1,000 m3 in 2011. Since the outdated 
Belarusian industrial infrastructure is highly energy-consuming, and gas has the predo-
minant share in Belarus’ energy balance (approximately 80%), each gas price rise has 
a detrimental effect on a significant number of enterprises. 
Another threat to the country’s economic stability is its significant negative trade balance. Be-
tween January and August, income from exports reached as little as around 30% of the level 
planned for this year. As a result, the foreign currency influx to the Belarusian economy is falling. 
At the same time, demand for foreign currencies is increasing among enterprises due to the rising 
costs of servicing their foreign debt and the higher costs of raw material imports. In effect, be-
tween January and August 2010, foreign currency demand among businesses exceeded its sup-
ply by over US$3.4 billion. For this reason, 
the Belarusian central bank has to make fre-
quent interventions on the market. This has 
slowed the growth in foreign currency rese-
rves, which despite the significant loans the 
government has taken are still clearly below 
a level which guarantees financial security 
(as of 1 October, they stood at approximately 
US$5.9 billion), and has forced the govern-
ment to incur higher debts. According to the latest data, the Belarusian public debt is US$9.5 
billion, and the total foreign debt of Belarus is US$23.1 billion, which is 45.5% of the country’s 
GDP and will be rising in the near future. The debt level is not critical as yet. However, the fact 
that Belarus will have to pay off as much as US$8 billion to its creditors in the next five years 
(the peak of repayments will fall in 2013–2014) makes the situation worse. The foreign debt 
service itself is a heavy burden, as it will cost US$695 million in 2011 alone. As a consequence, 
Belarus will gradually fall into a debt spiral, which means it will take subsequent loans to repay 
those taken before. An additional burden for the state’s finances is the public sector pay rises 
resulting from the populist moves made by the government before the presidential elections.
Lukashenka’s room for manoeuvre is shrinking
The increasing pressure from the Kremlin and the worsening economic situation are gradu-
ally lessening Lukashenka’s room for manoeuvre. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that in 
the next few years, a ‘point of no return’ will be reached when the Belarusian regime will 
have to give up its previous ‘dodging’ policy, which consisted in avoiding essential economic 
reforms and simultaneously resisting Russian demands. At the same time, the search for 
financial and raw-material support outside Europe, which has been so widely publicised by 
the Belarusian government, has failed to provide any real alternative to relations with Russia 
as yet. The multi-billion Chinese loans are linked to concrete investment projects, and are 
granted on condition that Chinese technologies, equipment and workforce are employed. 
For this reason, they may be helpful in the implementation of several investment pro-
jects, but cannot resolve the country’s key macroeconomic problems. In turn, the supplies 
of Venezuelan oil by sea via Ukrainian and Baltic ports which have been carried out since 
this April are still a political demonstration of independence from Moscow, rather than 
a viable alternative to Russian supplies2. 
The continuing reduction in Russian 
preferences has laid bare the weakness 
of the outdated Belarusian economic 
model, one of whose main sources of 
stability and development were the lo-
wer prices of fuels supplied from Russia. 
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However, it seems that despite these growing threats, Lukashenka will continue the previo-
us policy and support the existing system, perhaps out of fear of losing some or all of his 
authority. In practice, this means increasing the foreign debt to maintain foreign currency 
reserves and pay for current expenses. The Belarusian regime has readily applied such 
solutions so far. Under Lukashenka’s decree of May 2010, the Belarusian government was 
authorised to issue five-year Eurobonds in 2010–2011 for a total sum of US$2 billion. 
An issue covering half of the planned amount was carried out this July and August. Additio-
nally, in October the president ordered the placing of bonds worth approximately US$0.5 
billion on the Russian market. The government may also sell minority stakes in selected 
companies so as not to lose control of them. One example of such a transaction is the 
recently announced sale of a 25% stake in the Belarusian Potassium Company to Chinese 
investors, which may yield several billion dollars.
Lukashenka faces a dilemma over his choice of strategy
The temporary survival tactic will not resolve the key problems in the Belarusian economy, 
and will only delay the moment when the difficult decision has to be taken by one or two years. 
After that period, Belarus, which will have lost its creditworthiness, will have to make a strategic 
choice between the fulfilment of Russian demands and the need to modify its economic model. 
Meeting the Kremlin’s demands would first of all mean the sale of majority stakes in the key 
Belarusian companies. In exchange for that, Minsk could regain preferential oil and gas supply 
conditions, and obtain guarantees for broad access to the Russian outlet for Belarusian goods. 
On the other hand, relinquishing control of the country’s most important industrial plants wo-
uld deprive the Belarusian government of a greater part of its revenues, and would significan-
tly politically limit the country’s sovereignty, thus sealing its adherence to the Russian zone 
of influence. Although Lukashenka will keep the formal attributes of the presidency, in prac-
tice he will have to respect Russian intere-
sts to a greater extent than before, and his 
authority will only be nominal. However, 
the realisation of this scenario would not 
mean a total lack of economic reforms; 
regardless of Moscow’s preferences, Minsk 
will have to look for ways of making sa-
vings, reduce social welfare and restructu-
re individual branches of the economy. 
If Lukashenka decides to carry out reforms, 
he will have to completely discard the pre-
vious economic policy. In this case, the present economic model will be transformed to a lesser 
or greater extent. The regulations for doing business for domestic entities will be liberalised, 
at least partly. Facilitations for foreign investors will also be introduced. The privatisation of Be-
larusian enterprises will start. It cannot be ruled out that the initiated economic transformation 
will open up new opportunities for receiving loan support (at a level of several billion dollars an-
nually) from international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, which will – at least partly – allow the high costs of these reforms to be covered. 
At the same time, an increasing influx of foreign investments and the improving efficiency of 
the economy resulting from the reforms may over time bring revenues to the state budget, and 
enable the repayment of the incurred loans in the longer term. Another aspect of such reforms 
could be the increase in the share of the services sector in Belarus’ GDP and the reduction 
of the heavy industry sector’s share, which predominates at the moment. The modernisation 
of the energy-consuming and outdated industrial infrastructure appears equally important. 
However, it seems that despite these 
growing threats, Lukashenka will conti-
nue the previous policy and support 
the existing system, perhaps out of fear 
of losing some or all of his authority. 
In practice, this means increasing the 
foreign debt to maintain foreign currency 
reserves and pay for current expenses. 
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At the same time, it seems rather unlikely that choosing this scenario will entail a complete 
and comprehensive economic transformation. Reforms will be carried out gradually and to 
a limited extent, because genuine economic liberalisation in Belarus must entail relinquishing 
some or all control of at least some sectors by the government, which it sees as a serious 
threat to the system’s stability. Furthermore, even a partial economic restructuring will upset 
the long-lived (unwritten) social contract between the regime and the public, which has 
guaranteed the citizens stability of employment and social welfare among other benefits. 
Besides, putting strategic entities up for 
sale in open tenders will mean Russian 
investors having access to them, becau-
se only they are able to ensure cheap fuel 
supplies and an outlet for the goods ma-
nufactured by the plants (tractors, trucks, 
buses and harvesters). Therefore, the most 
likely solution in this case seems to be the 
restructuring of those entities, while still 
keeping them under state control. 
Forecast
The Kremlin’s policy will be a key factor which will determine Minsk’s moves. Alyaksandr Lu-
kashenka will have to choose a scenario for further development of his country while coming 
under increasing pressure from Russia, and everything seems to indicate that the Kremlin 
is determined to achieve its goals in Belarus. This may bring about a crisis over oil and/or 
gas supplies in late 2010 or early 2011. In turn, the worsening economic situation may give 
rise to anti-Lukashenka sentiments in Belarusian society and among part of the political elite. 
In an extreme version, it may not be ruled out that Russian activity will cause Lukashenka’s 
removal from power. 
At the moment, it is difficult to forecast which strategic choice the present Belarusian govern-
ment will make, especially that both the fulfilment of Russia’s demands and the economic 
transformation entail the need to modify the politico-economic system Lukashenka has created. 
However, it cannot be ruled out that Lukashenka’s fear of increasingly tough actions by the 
Kremlin will make him launch economic reforms. This is the only way in which Belarus may be-
come independent of Russian preferences, and thus maintain its previous level of sovereignty.
Meeting the Kremlin’s demands would 
first of all mean the sale of majority 
stakes in the key Belarusian compa-
nies. In exchange for that, Minsk could 
regain preferential oil and gas supply 
conditions, and obtain guarantees 
for broad access to the Russian outlet 
for Belarusian goods. 
